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Abstract
In this paper we experimentally test a theory of boundedly rational
behavior in a “lemons” market. We analyze two different market designs,
for which perfect rationality implies complete and partial market collapse,
respectively. Our empirical observations deviate substantially from the
predictions of rational choice theory: Even after 20 repetitions, the actual
outcome is closer to efficiency than expected.
We examine to which extent the theory of iterated reasoning con-
tributes to the explanation of these observations. Perfectly rational be-
havior requires a player to perform an infinite number of iterative reason-
ing steps. Boundedly rational players, however, carry out only a limited
number of such iterations. We have determined the iteration type of the
players independently from their market behavior. A significant correla-
tion exists between the iteration types and the observed price offers.
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1 Introduction
Akerlof (1970) has identified asymmetric information as a source of inefficient
market outcomes and even market collapse. In experimental as well as in real
world “lemons markets,” however, the empirical extent of market failure is
smaller than predicted by rational choice theory.1 We have run two experi-
ments in which the participants had to trade under asymmetric information.
The prices offered by the uninformed buyers, as well as the amount of goods
traded, were much higher than those predicted by rational choice theory. A
theoretical explanation for this deviation from perfectly rational behavior can
be drawn from the theory of iterative reasoning.
Iterative reasoning is applicable in games in which iterative dominance is
prevalent.2 The idea of iterative reasoning has been explored in numerous ex-
periments.3 Perfectly rational behavior in a lemons market requires the players
to eliminate dominated strategies in an infinite number of iteration steps. As
boundedly rational decision-makers are able to perform only a limited number
of iterations, this theory leads us to predict that they will bid higher prices. The
outcome of a lemons market with boundedly rational buyers is, therefore, less
inefficient than the market result if only perfectly rational buyers are present.
In our experiment, we have examined to which extent the price offers of an
uninformed buyer can be explained by his “iteration type”4, i.e., the number of
iteration steps he performs when eliminating dominated strategies. Our exper-
imental data shows a negative correlation between the buyers’ iteration types
and their price offers. However, this negative correlation can only be confirmed
for those subjects who perform a positive number of iteration steps. In the
course of the experiments, many decisions appear to have been made without
any elimination of dominated strategies. These subjects have rather picked
their prices randomly. Just as the rational choice theory, the theory of iterative
reasoning has little predictive power with regard to players who act randomly.
However, an explorative analysis of our experimental data indicates that this
1An early example is the “acquire-a-company” experiment by Bazerman/Samuelson (1983).
2Section 5.6 of Camerer (2003) explains the “levels of reasoning” concept.
3See, e.g., Schotter/Weigelt/Wilson (1994).
4See Costa-Gomes/Broseta/Crawford (2001).
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buyer type, just as the boundedly rational type, has chosen higher prices than
those subjects who were identified as perfectly rational.
The main contribution of our paper lies in the fact that we have determined
the buyers’ iteration types independently of the observable behavior which the
types are supposed to explain. Existing studies on iterative reasoning have
inferred the iteration types from the observed behavior. A famous example is
the “guessing game” experiment in Nagel (1995).5 For two reasons, we have
chosen a different approach: First, if the iteration type is directly derived from
the observed prices, the former cannot be used as an explanation for the the
latter. Secondly, the direct derivation method would categorize any buyer as
rational who offers a very low price. However, this behavior could as well be
caused by the failure to perform any iteration steps at all. Our method allows to
distinguish between perfectly rational buyers and players who just act randomly.
Another difference between our experiment and Nagel’s is the focus of iter-
ative reasoning. Deviation from the behavior that is predicted under common
knowledge of rationality can be explained by her theory even without discarding
the assumption that all players are fully rational. It is sufficient to assume that
a player falsely believes that some of the peers perform only a limited number
of iteration steps, and then reacts optimally to this belief by staying exactly one
iteration step ahead.6 Hence, it is not a cognitive limitation of the player under
scrutiny that makes him perform only a finite number of iteration steps.7 Our
model does not focus on the beliefs of the player under scrutiny. If he deviates
from perfectly rational behavior, this is explained by his performing a finite
number of iteration steps, which is caused by his limited cognitive ability.8
Our research program is depicted in Figure 1. We have evaluated two distinct
5See also Thaler (1997), Nagel et al. (1999), Selten/Nagel (1998), and Ho/Camerer/Weigelt
(1998). Other examples are Beard/Beil (1994), Eyster/Rabin (2005), and Ku¨bler/Weizsa¨cker
(2004).
6A generalization has been presented by Camerer/Ho/Chong (2001) and (2004): In their
theory, a type 0 chooses randomly, while a type k > 0 assumes that other players are of type
0 through k − 1, and responds optimally to this belief.
7A related concept is the “cursed equilibrium” in Eyster/Rabin (1995): A “cursed” player
assumes his opponents to choose their type-contingent optimal behavior with a probability
smaller than one. With the counter-probability, he expects them to choose average behavior,
and reacts optimally to this belief.
8Stahl/Wilson (1995, 128) discuss the different types of bounded rationality models.
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data sets which were generated independently from each other. The one variable
consists of the observed prices offered by the uninformed buyers in the lemons
market, denoted by p. The source of the other variable is a questionnaire filled
out in each round by the buyers directly after having submitted their price
offers. We are fully aware that relying on verbal statements given by participants
following their decisions bears a risk – the statements may retrospectively serve
as a rationalization of the own behavior. In our case, however, this problem
can safely be neglected for two reasons: First, if a subject has the ability to
perform just one iteration step, he is unable to imitate a higher type. Secondly,
the subjects had to fill out the questionnaire before they learned the actual
outcome resulting from their decisions. Hence, there was no information given
between the decision and the verbal statement that might have been used for
an update.
We asked the buyers to briefly describe their line of reasoning, and we have
used these written statements to categorize the participants into iteration types
(denoted by i).9 Their self-descriptions indicate that some buyers have randomly
chosen their price offers (type-0), while others have performed just one iteration
step (type-1) or decided in a rather elaborate fashion (type-2 and higher). We
therefore distinguish only these three categories of iteration types. We have
applied the theory of iterative reasoning to our lemons market model and derived
price intervals from which we predict a buyer of type i to choose his price offer.
In the final step, we compared the type-consistent price intervals with the
observed prices p to answer our research question: Does a negative relation exist
between iteration types and observed prices? We have found two main results:
• The verbal statements of most of the subjects do not allow for the in-
terpretation that they have performed iterative elimination of dominated
strategies. These participants seem to have acted rather randomly.
• A significant negative correlation between type and price offer exists for
those types who have performed iteration steps. Moreover, we have ob-
served that most of these types’ price offers were actually taken from the
9Nagel (1995, 1318) mentions that written comments of the subjects in her experiment seem
to support her results, but she has not derived the subjects’ types from these statements.
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Figure 1: Iteration Types of Buyers and Observed Prices
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In Section 2, we introduce two versions of a lemons market. Under the as-
sumption of perfect rationality the predicted outcomes in the two markets are
complete and partial market collapse, respectively. We then introduce our no-
tion of iterative reasoning and derive the predicted behavior for different degrees
of bounded rationality.
In Section 3, we describe our experiments. In the first experiment, the sub-
jects play each market setting just once (sections 3.1 to 3.2). In Section 3.3, the
second experiment is reported, in which the participants repeatedly played one
of the two market designs. Section 4 concludes the article with a discussion of
the possible implications for economic policy, in particular for the regulation of
lemons markets.
2 Adverse Selection
2.1 Setup
This section presents two versions of a lemons market model that we have tested
in a series of experiments. In one parameter setting, the market is expected to
collapse completely. In the other setting some trade is predicted to take place.
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However, efficiency would require all units in both markets to be traded.
Consider a market in which an unspecified good is traded. We assume its
quality to be uniformly distributed over the interval [0, 1] and denote the actual
quality of a specific unit as Q. Two groups of agents are active in this market:
• Sellers, each of whom owns one unit of the good and knows its true quality.
The sellers’ valuation is denoted as a(Q), with a(Q) = βQ.
• Buyers, who cannot observe the true quality of a certain unit of the good,
but know the distribution of quality. Their valuation is denoted as n(Q) =
γ + δQ.
We assume γ ≥ 0 and δ ≥ β > 0. Thus, for each quality level Q > 0, the
buyers’ valuation exceeds the sellers’.10 We also assume the following interaction
structure: Each buyer makes a price offer. The offer is randomly assigned to
a specific seller, who then decides whether to accept the offer or not. If the
seller accepts, then the unit is traded. If the seller refuses the offer, then no
transaction takes place.
Denote the initial monetary endowment of the players as Vi ≥ 0 and the (ex
post) gain from trade as Pii, with i = b, s for buyers and sellers. If a seller
accepts a certain price offer p, then his payoff is Vs + p. If he rejects the offer,
his payoff is Vs + βQ. His gain from trade, therefore, amounts to p− βQ. It is
rational for a seller to accept a price offer only if it exceeds his valuation of the
good (Πs > 0 or, equivalently, p > βQ). The simplicity of the sellers’ decisions
later allows us to focus on the buyers’ reasoning process only, and the buyers’
priors about the sellers’ perfect rationality can be taken for granted.
If a price offer p is accepted by a seller, then the buyer’s payoff amounts
to Vb + γ + δQ − p. If it is rejected, he is left with Vb. Ex post, his gain
from trade is γ + δQ− p. An uninformed buyer faces a much more complicated
decision problem than a seller. When perfectly rational, he tries to maximize the
10Under symmetric information, the efficient outcome could easily be achieved. For each
quality level, there is a buyer whose willingness to pay exceeds the respective seller’s willingness
to accept, and the market will be cleared. If both market sides are uninformed, but do know
the distribution of quality, then each buyer and seller would agree to trade a specific unit for
a price between their valuations of the average quality.
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expected gain from successfully closing a transaction by choosing an appropriate
price offer p, but he is unaware of the true quality.
2.2 Perfectly Rational Buyers
Any price offer p ≤ β divides the interval of possible qualities into three sub-
sets:11
• Q < n−1(p): The offer is accepted, but the buyer suffers a loss;
• n−1(p) < Q < a−1(p): The offer is accepted with a profit for the buyer;
• Q > a−1(p): The offer is rejected.
The assumption a(Q) = βQ implies a−1(p) = p/β. The buyer’s expected gain
from trade, conditional on his submitted price offer, is given by
EΠb(p) =
∫ p/β
0
[n(Q)− p]dQ =
∫ p/β
0
[γ + δQ]dQ− p
2
β
.
A perfectly rational buyer chooses his price offer to maximize EΠb(p). We
distinguish two different parameter settings regarding n(Q) = γ + δQ:
1. γ = 0 and δ > β.
2. γ > 0 and δ = β.
In case 1, the valuations of both the sellers and the buyers start at the origin,
and the buyers’ valuation has greater slope. Case 2 is characterized by par-
allel valuation lines. The following proposition derives the optimal price offer,
denoted by p∗, made by a perfectly rational decision maker.12
Proposition: Assume a market in which the buyers’ valuation of
quality Q is n(Q) = γ + δ(Q), and the sellers’ valuation is a(Q) =
βQ, with γ ≥ 0 and δ ≥ β > 0. If
11Price offers greater than β are strictly dominated and can, therefore, be neglected: With
p = β, the price offer would attract all possible qualities up to Q = 1. Hence, a higher price
offer cannot make the buyer better off.
12The proof of this proposition is confined to the appendix.
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i) δ < 2β, then the optimal price offer under the first parameter
setting (γ = 0 and δ > β) is p∗ = 0, and the average traded
quality is 0,
ii) δ < 2β, then the optimal price offer under the second parameter
setting (γ > 0 and δ = β) is p∗ = γ, and the average traded
quality equals γ/2β,
iii) δ ≥ 2β, then the optimal price offer is p∗ = β, and the average
traded quality is 1/2.
An optimal price p∗ = 0 implies that the market collapses completely. Even
though it is efficient to trade all units in the market, asymmetric information
makes perfectly rational buyers abstain from positive offers, so no units are
traded. In the second case, the market collapses only partially: Units with
Q ≤ a−1(γ) = γ/β are traded.
2.3 Boundedly Rational Buyers
2.3.1 Iterative Reasoning
Now we present a more general model which is based on iterative thinking. It
allows for modelling both boundedly and perfectly rational players. We start
with a buyer who does not analyze the situation at all. He picks his price offer
randomly. We call this type of behavior “performing zero iteration steps.” If
another buyer acknowledges that the quality is uniformly distributed between 0
and 1, he would base his decision on the expected quality of 1/2. Such a buyer
would then offer a price ranging between the sellers’ and his own valuation of the
expected Q = 1/2. This buyer performs the first step of the iterative reasoning
process. His maximal willingness to pay is n(1/2).
A third buyer may realize in this situation that, even if he offers his maximal
willingness to pay, the sellers who own the highest qualities would refuse his
offer. If the buyer understands this, then the expected quality of the good he will
actually receive, conditional on his price offer, is smaller than the unconditional
expected quality his price offer was based on after the first step of reasoning.
Therefore, this buyer will update his offer and bid a lower price. A buyer
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who stops here has performed two steps of iterative reasoning. In the next
reasoning steps, a buyer would realize that the lower the price offer, the smaller
the maximum quality the buyer can expect to receive.
Let us denote the expected quality for a buyer who performs k steps of itera-
tive reasoning as EQk. We assume that such a player represents the distribution
of the quality by this expected value. The buyers’ maximum willingness to pay
is denoted as nk = n(EQk); k ∈ IN.
2.3.2 Complete Market Collapse
In parameter setting 1 (i.e., γ = 0 and δ > β), the maximum willingness to pay of
a buyer who performs only one step of iterative reasoning is n1 = n(EQ1) = δ/2.
We limit our focus to cases where δ < 2β, which implies n1 < β. To conclude a
transaction, this buyer should at least bid the sellers’ valuation of the expected
quality a1 = a(EQ1) = β/2.
At a price offered after one step of iterative reasoning, all sellers who offer
a quality greater than Q1 = a−1(n1) = δ/2β will prefer to keep their item for
themselves. It is due to the assumption δ < 2β that, even if the buyer offers his
maxiumum willingness to pay, the sellers who own units of high quality can be
expected to reject the offer, or: Q1 < 1.
If a buyer performs a second reasoning step, he anticipates Q1 to be the high-
est possible quality in the market if he offers p = n1. Therefore, the expected
quality contingent on the maximal offer during the first step of iterative reason-
ing is EQ2 = 0.5Q1. Therefore, such a buyer has a maximum willingness to pay,
contingent on his beliefs, which amounts to n2 = n(EQ2) = δQ1/2 = δ2/4β.
The assumption δ < 2β implies EQ2 < EQ1 and n2 < n1.
Figure 2 displays EQ1, a1, n1, Q1, and EQ2. Quality is shown on the
horizontal axis, the valuations of both sellers and buyers on the vertical axis.
The upper diagonal line represents the buyers’ valuation, n(Q), and the lower
one represents the sellers’ valuation, a(Q). Clearly, Qk as well as nk decrease
as the number of iteration steps k increases. Iterative reasoning leads to lower
price offers, the greater the number of reasoning steps carried out. For an
infinite number of steps, the buyer reaches the price offer predicted for perfectly
9
Figure 2: Complete market collapse: first step of iterative reasoning
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rational buyers: He offers zero, and no unit is traded. Boundedly rational
players, however, carry out only a limited number of steps. For any number
of reasoning steps k a player performs, we can derive an interval [ak, nk] from
which this theory predicts the player to choose his price offer.
2.3.3 Partial Market Collapse
For the second parameter setting (γ > 0 and δ = β), Figure 3 demonstrates
the situation of a decision-maker who performs one step of iterative reasoning.
Such a buyer assumes an expected quality EQ1 = 1/2. Thus, he should offer a
price between a1 = a(EQ1) = β/2 and n1 = n(EQ1) = γ + β/2.
If a buyer carries out a second step, he would realize that, even if he bids
n1, the sellers holding a unit of the highest quality would reject his offer. The
highest possible quality which a buyer actually expects to achieve during the
first step of reasoning is Q1 = a−1(n1) = (2γ +β)/2β. Thus, this buyer expects
a quality that equals Q1/2 = (2γ +β)/4β. After an infinite number of iteration
steps, a perfectly rational buyer offers p = γ, and qualities below 1/3 are traded.
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Figure 3: Partial market collapse
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3 The Experiment
3.1 Experimental Design
The experimental parameter settings with complete and partial market collapse
are labeled as (comp), and (part), respectively. In the (part) market, we chose
δ = 3, and γ = 1. Hence, the buyers’ valuation was n(Q) = 1 + 3Q. In
the (comp) market, we chose δ = 4 and γ = 0, leading to n(Q) = 4Q. In
both designs, the sellers’ valuation was fixed as a(Q) = 3Q (thus β = 3). We
conducted two experiments with two treatments each.
Experiment 1:
• treatment A: first (part), then (comp);
• treatment B: first (comp), then (part).
Experiment 2:
• treatment C: 20 rounds (comp);
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• treatment D: 20 rounds (part).
In treatments A and B, each subject played (part) and (comp) once. We
added treatments C and D in order to examine whether the observations of the
first two treatments had merely been first-round effects. Here, 20 rounds of
(comp) and (part) were played.13 The experiments were conducted with 248
students of Karlsruhe University (Germany) who participated in 18 experimen-
tal sessions (five sessions each for treatments A and B, and four sessions each for
C and D). The group size ranged from 16 to 20 participants per session. Each
of the subjects participated in only one session. Most of the participants were
studying Business Engineering at the undergraduate level. At the time of the
experiment, none of them had enjoyed any formal training in contract theory.
In each session, the group was split in half and randomly assigned to two
different rooms. The participants were not permitted to communicate with each
other. The written instructions were distributed and read aloud. Questions were
asked and answered only in private.
The first experiment was not computerized, i.e., paper and pencil were
used. The participants in each of the rooms first acted as buyers (they submitted
price offers to the other room), and then acted as sellers (they received price
offers from the other room). We let subjects take over both roles because sellers
only had to make the simple decision of whether or not a certain price offer
exceeded the valuation of their unit of the good.14 Every buyer wrote a price
offer on a prepared form. An administrator in each room first collected all the
price offers. Then he endowed the players in his room with one unit of the
good.15 The price offers were randomly allocated to the participants in the
other room, and the sellers’ decisions were made.
After having submitted their price offers in each round, and before having
learned the actual results, the buyers were asked to write down, in their own
13The instructions for (part) in treatments A and B are included in Appendix B. The highly
similar instructions for (comp) as well as for the second experiment are available on request.
14In the first session of both treatments A and B, the subjects played only one role, either
that of buyer or seller. From the second session on, we switched to the above procedure.
15This guaranteed that the quality of participants’ units (as sellers) did not affect their price
offers (as buyers).
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words, the line of reasoning that led to the corresponding price offer.16 Finally,
the subjects learned their individual outcomes in private. Only those buyers
whose offers were accepted learned about the quality their anonymous partner
was endowed with. The second round was carried out in the same way as the
first, but with a different market design.
While acting as buyers, participants received an initial endowment of 4 Euros
per round, which ensured that their willingness to pay did not exceed their
ability to pay. As sellers, the subjects received an additional show-up fee of
3 Euros which compensated for the possibility of being endowed with a poor-
quality good. After the two rounds, the subjects were paid their earnings in
cash. The chosen parameters resulted in an average payment of about 8 Euros,
and the experiment lasted approximately 50 minutes.
The second experiment was computerized. Each subject played 20 rep-
etitions of only one of the above market designs, i.e., (comp) or (part). The
subjects were seated and instructed the same way as under treatments A and
B.17 The buyers were endowed with 4 ECU (experimental currency units) per
round. The sellers received one unit of the good (the quality of which could
be different in each round), and 2 ECU per round to compensate for the pos-
sibility of receiving low qualities of the good. In every round, each buyer was
randomly and anonymously matched anew with one of the sellers. After each
round, the buyers were asked to write down their reasoning regarding the prices
they offered in a questionnaire (we used the same wording as in treatments A
and B). Then the subjects were informed about their own outcome from the
preceding round. After 20 rounds, subjects were paid their earnings in cash.
10 ECU amounted to 1.25 Euros. The sessions lasted about one hour, and the
participants were paid about 10 Euros on average.
16The exact wording of the question was, now translated into English, “Please briefly de-
scribe the reasoning that led to your particular price offer.”
17The procedures differed only slightly from treatments A and B in that the subjects stayed
in the randomly assigned role of either buyer or seller during all 20 rounds. Even though
the sellers’ situation was of the same simplicity as under treatments A and B, it appeared
reasonable not to switch roles. This experiment was computerized, and we wanted to avoid the
possibility of subjects mixing up the two roles if confronted with different computer screens
in rapid sequence.
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3.2 One-shot Play in Treatments A and B
3.2.1 Description of Individual Data
Figures 4 and 5 give an overview of all price offers made in both rounds of each
design. Treatment A, i.e., (part) in the first round and (comp) in the second,
contains 50 observations. Treatment B (first (comp), then (part)) consists of 51
observations per round. The bold symbols represent rejected offers (no trade),
and the open ones represent accepted prices (trade). The dots depict the first
round of play, i.e., (part1) in Figure 4, and (comp1) in Figure 5, and the triangles
represent the second round of play, i.e., (part2) and (comp2). The line represents
the sellers’ valuation of their quality. For all decisions to be rational, no bold
symbol should appear above the line as the offered price exceeded the seller’s
valuation. Moreover, no open symbol should appear beneath the line since the
price is short of the valuation. Only a negligible number of the sellers’ decisions
appear irrational.18
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0,00 0,50 1,00 1,50 2,00 2,50 3,00
Quality
Price
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a(Q) = 3Q
Figure 4: Price Offers in (part)
18In Figure 4, we observe 0 rejected offers that should have been accepted, i.e., no bold
symbol appears above the line, and 5 accepted offers that should have been rejected, i.e.,
5 open symbols appear below the line. In Figure 5, only 1 rejected offer should have been
accepted, and 2 accepted offers were better rejected.
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3.2.2 Does the Ordering of the Market Designs Matter?
The first step in evaluating the experimental data relates to the question of
whether the ordering of the two market designs in treatments A and B has a
significant influence on the offered prices.19 Thus, our first null hypothesis is:
In both market designs, the offered prices in first-round play do not
differ from those in second-round play.
A Wilcoxon test shows for each market design that the prices offered in the
first round did not differ significantly from the observed prices in the second
round.20 Thus, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected for both of the market
designs, and we have derived our first result.
Result 1: The observed price offers are independent of the order in
which the market designs were played.
19We have used SPSS version 13.0 and SysStat 8.0, two statistical software packages from
SPSS Inc., to evaluate the data. All tests were conducted at a 5 percent significance level.
20For each market design, we compared the results of the first and second round play by
using a Wilcoxon test controlled for ties. The pairwise comparison of (part1), and (part2)
reveals that in 20 cases the second round price is larger than the corresponding first round
price. In 26 cases, the reverse is true. The Z value for our test is -1.640 with a (two-sided)
probability 0.101. In the (comp) markets, the second round price is larger than the first round
price in 19 cases, and vice versa in 23 cases. The Z value is 0.050 with a (two-sided) probability
of 0.95.
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This result encouraged us to evaluate the data generated for each market
design without regard to whether it was generated in the first or the second
round.21
3.2.3 Do Buyers Offer Rational Prices?
The proposition in Section 2.2 and the theoretical analysis in 2.3 show that fully
rational buyers in each of the two market designs need to perform an infinite
number of iterative reasoning steps. Many recent experimental studies, however,
reveal that iterative reasoning seems to stop after very few steps, if it starts at
all. Thus, we conjecture a considerable number of subjects to be boundedly
rational when formulating the following null hypothesis:
In the (comp) market, only p = 0 is offered, while in the (part)
market, only p = 1 is offered.
According to the Proposition in Section 2.2, the average traded quality in (comp)
should be zero, whereas in the (part) market it is expected to be 1/6, if the
above null hypothesis is true. The descriptive aggregate data of both (comp)
and (part) are provided in Table 1.22 It shows the minimum, maximum, and
average values of the price offers, qualities, and traded qualities, as well as the
buyers’ and sellers’ gains from trade in each market design.23
Table 1: Basic Data per Round (in Euros, endowments excluded)
p Q traded Q Πb Πs
min 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.20 -1.16
(part) average 1.66 0.51 0.34 0.12 0.47
101 observations max 3.00 1.00 0.94 2.16 2.20
min 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.71 -1.26
(comp) average 1.31 0.51 0.29 -0.21 0.34
101 observations max 3.40 1.00 0.94 2.18 2.08
21We have also evaluated the data of the two rounds separately, which leads to conclusions
that are identical to those subsequently derived.
22As mentioned above, the subjects acted either as buyers or sellers in the first session.
Therefore, the number of observations is not exactly the half of the number of participants.
23The table only shows the gains and losses from trade (the sellers’ show-up fee, their
endowments with the good, and the buyers’ monetary endowment are excluded).
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In (part), 60% of the price offers are accepted, and the average price of 1.66
is significantly greater than the predicted p = 1.24 The average traded quality
of 0.34 is nearly twice as high as the theoretical prediction of 0.17.
In (comp), 46% of all prices offered are accepted. The average price offer
amounts to 1.31 Euros, and the average traded quality is 0.29, both of which are
obviously far greater than zero. Clearly, the market does not collapse completely
under the (comp) design, so we can reject the null hypothesis also for this market
design.
Result 2: In both market designs, observed prices are higher than
predicted for perfectly rational players.
Since some goods are traded, buyers in the (part) design earn an average
payoff of 0.12 Euros but make an average loss of 0.21 in the (comp) market.
Sellers in (part) earn 0.47, whereas in (comp) they only earn 0.34 Euros per
round on average.
3.2.4 Does Limited Iterative Reasoning Explain the Price Offers?
In this section, we examine the data with regard to our claim that iterative
thinking may provide an explanation for the observation that prices and traded
qualities are higher than predicted by rational choice theory. The argument
proceeds in four steps:
1. We have determined the participants’ iteration types independently from
their submitted price offers. After each round, the subjects gave descrip-
tions of their own reasoning. We denote the number of iterative reasoning
steps a subject apparently has carried out according to his self-description,
as “i” and call the subject “type-i.”
2. According to the theory of iterative reasoning and the valuations ai, ni
presented in Section 2.3, we derive the predicted, i.e., the type-consistent
price interval for each type-i.
24The two-sided one-sample t-test shows that the empirical average is significantly greater
than the theoretical average of 1. The test results are as follows: average = 1.664, t = 12.351,
and p = 0.000.
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3. We then observe the actual price offer p.
4. Finally, we are interested to see whether a negative correlation exists be-
tween the type-i of a participant and his actual price offer. Moreover, we
explore whether the observed price offer has been chosen from the type-
consistent price interval. If not, then the theory of iterative reasoning
would have no explanatory power with regard to the observed behavior.
We have sorted the self-descriptions into three type-i categories.25 If a self-
description did not contain an expected quality of 1/2 nor any further systematic
evaluation of the market situation, we categorized this subject into type-0.26
Participants who expressly mentioned they were calculating with an expected
quality of 1/2 were encoded as type-1.27 All individuals who performed more
iterative reasoning steps were grouped into the last category, called type-2+.28
Most of the written statements indicate that players either perform 0, 1, 2, or
an infinite number of iteration steps.29
Table 2 displays the price interval from which a certain iteration type would
consistently choose his price offer, as we have demonstrated with our theoretical
analysis in Section 2.3). We have encountered three specifics:
• A subject of type-0 is expected to offer prices from 0 to 4 in both market
designs. Hence, any price offer would be type-consistent. Thus, our theory
does not provide falsifiable hypotheses with regard to type-0.
25In Appendix C, we present an overview of some typical verbal statements of each type.
The encoding of the verbal statements was done without any knowledge of the offered prices.
The filled in questionnaires are available on request.
26For instance, typical lines of reasoning that we categorized as type-0 subjects were “I
chose p such that quality gets better”, or “I had no idea, I just gambled”, or “I analyzed what
the seller’s quality must be, compared to my price offer.” The third statement could as well be
made by a subject who understood the market mechanism well, but was unable or unwilling
to describe this in more detail. However, this statement is too ambiguous to be anything else
than type-0. Overall, we have been rather hesitant when categorizing a statement into type-1
or type-2+.
27Subjects of type-1 could easily be identified. Typical examples for a type-1 statement
are “E(Q) = 1/2 and a(Q) = 1.5, thus my offer is 1.51”, or “I calculated E(Q) = 1/2 and
wanted to make some profits.”
28The subjects’ self-descriptions did not allow us to distinguish, e.g., type-5 from type-6.
A typical type-2+ statement was, e.g., “The possible loss is always higher than the possible
gain, thus on average there is always a loss.”
29Thus, our observations are in accordance with studies such as Nagel (1995), or
Ku¨bler/Weizsa¨cker (2004).
18
Table 2: Types-i and Type-i-consistent Price Offer Intervals
buyer’s type-i min offer max offer
0 0.00 4.00
comp 1 1.50 2.00
2+ 0.00 1.33
0 0.00 4.00
part 1 1.50 2.50
2+ 0.00 2.25
• In the (comp) market design, prices between 1.33 and 1.5 can neither be
related to type-1, nor to type-2+. Such prices were offered only twice.
• The predicted price intervals in (part) overlap. Prices between 1.5 and
2.25 would be consistent with type-1 and type-2. Nevertheless, any price
below 1.5 is consistent only with type-2+.
Tables 3 and 4 show the frequencies of chosen prices30, where the first column
lists the price offer intervals as presented in Table 2 and discussed above. In the
bottom two rows, the types’ average and median prices are depicted.
Table 3: (comp) by Type-i. 101 possible observations, 4 descriptions missing
Type-
Price offer interval 0 1 2+ Sum
p > 2 5 0 0 5
1.5 ≤ p ≤ 2 30 22 1 53
1.33 < p < 1.5 2 2 0 4
p ≤ 1.33 20 5 10 35
Sum 57 29 11 97
Average price by type 1.45 1.47 0.29 –
Median price by type 1.50 1.50 0.00 –
59% of the subjects in the (comp) and 64% in the (part) market design
have described themselves as type-0. Extremely high prices, i.e., prices located
in the first interval, have seldom but solely been chosen by types-0. Since
30In both markets, four descriptions are missing, as four subjects did not fill in the ques-
tionnaire.
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Table 4: (part) by Type-i: 101 possible observations, 4 descriptions missing
Type-
Price offer interval 0 1 2+ Sum
p > 2.5 2 0 0 2
2.25 < p ≤ 2.5 4 4 0 8
1.5 ≤ p ≤ 2.25 36 20 4 60
p < 1.5 20 1 6 27
Sum 62 25 10 97
Average price by type 1.66 1.91 1.17 –
Median price by type 1.63 2.00 1.00 –
type-0 chooses a price randomly, any price offer is consistent with type-0 (type-
consistent choices are printed bold in Tables 3 and 4). In (comp), 76% of types-
1 and 91% of types-2 offer type-consistent prices. In (part), the percentages
amount to 96% and 100%, respectively. Thus, regarding the descriptives, our
observations are to a large extent in line with the theory.31 As our theory
generates restricted price offer intervals only for type-1 and type-2+, we initially
conjecture a negative relation between offered prices and type-i for i = 1, 2+.
Thus we test the (converse) null hypothesis for type-1 and 2+:
The higher the type, the higher the price in both market designs.
The highly significant32 rank order correlations amount to -0.57 in (comp), and
to -0.65 in (part). Tables 3, and 4 have shown that the negative relations of
types and prices are based on a large number of type-consistent price choices.
We draw the following conclusion:
Result 3: The iteration types 1 and 2+ derived from the subjects’
self-descriptions are significantly negatively correlated with the ob-
served price offers.
Though restricted price intervals are theoretically derived only for type-1 and
type-2+, we can explore differences in median price offers among all three types
31A χ2-test would clearly support this result, but its application faces the problem that too
many entries in Tables 3 and 4 equal zero.
32The tests each reveal a (one-sided) p-level of 0.000. We used the prices and self-descriptions
generated by types-1 and 2+ in each market to conduct the tests.
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in each market (see Tables 3 and 4 for the median prices).33 The Kruskal-Wallis
ANOVA on ranks in (comp) reveals that the three groups differ significantly in
median prices (H = 19.811, df = 2, p < 0.001). Also in (part), the differences
in median prices are significant among the three types (H = 13.522, df = 2,
p = 0.001).
The pairwise comparisons (Dunn’s method)34 show that, in both market de-
signs, types-2+ chose significantly lower prices than types-1, which confirms the
above stated result 3. What is more, types-2+ have submitted lower price offers
than types-0, which, however, is significant only in (comp). The comparison
between types-0 and types-1 exhibits no significant difference in both markets.
Overall, there is no evidence that lower iteration types have chosen lower prices
than higher types. Hence, this explorative analysis sustains the idea that itera-
tive thinking may contribute to explaining the observed deviations from perfect
rationality.
3.2.5 Is Limited Iterative Reasoning Efficiency-enhancing?
In the previous sections, we derived the conclusion that bounded rationality
on the buyers’ side prevents one-shot lemons markets from a complete or par-
tial collapse. Figure 6 shows which market side profited or lost from trade in
treatments A and B.
The point labeled “no trade” or “rational(comp)” represents the situation
without trade, as well as the outcome which rational choice theory predicts
for the (comp) market. The lower diagonal indicates the iso-welfare line (for a
utilitarian welfare function, which defines welfare as the sum of the parties’ out-
comes) for the zero welfare level. Point “data(comp)” is the observed outcome
under the (comp) design: The total gains from trade amount to 34.5 Euros for
the sellers, and to -21.2 Euros for the buyers. Trade has earned the group of
sellers a remarkable gain which even exceeds the loss suffered by the group of
33We do not test group differences in mean prices by using a one-way ANOVA, as the data
in Treatments C and D did neither pass the normality tests nor the equal variance tests. Thus,
the non-parametric alternative, i.e., the Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA on ranks is always applied.
We used the prices and self-descriptions generated by types-0, 1 and 2+ in each market to
conduct the tests.
34Dunn’s method is used as a post hoc test and is conducted to a 5%-level of significance.
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Figure 6: Total Gains from Trade
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buyers. Trade has increased total welfare, but only in the Kaldor-Hicks sense.
Voluntary trade does not lead to a Pareto-improvement. Boundedly rational
buyers would prefer prohibition over free trade if this were the only way to
protect them from their losses.
The analysis comes to different results for the (part) design. The theoret-
ical prediction, assuming perfect rationality, is represented by the point “ra-
tional(part)”: If the buyers offer a price p = 1, then only units with quality
Q < 1/3 are traded. Trading one unit generates a welfare gain of 1. With
a uniform distribution of quality and 101 buyers, the expected welfare gain is
33.67. The price p = 1, which is predicted by rational choice theory, distributes
this welfare gain evenly among the two market sides, so both sides receive 16.83.
The upper diagonal represents the welfare level achieved in this outcome. The
actual result, however, is shown at the point labeled “data(part)”: The earn-
ings of the sellers accrue to a total of 47.6, while the buyers receive a total of
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12.4 Euros. Welfare is higher than under perfect rationality, but – as in the
(comp) market – at the buyers’ expense. The sellers profit from the existence of
bounded rationality among the buyers, while the boundedly rational buyers are
(on average) worse off than perfectly rational buyers would be. However, in the
(comp) market, both sides gain from voluntary trade, as it induces a Pareto-
improvement. Hence, for this market design our study provides no justification
for prohibition.35
3.3 Repeated Play in Treatments C and D
According to section 3.2.4, many subjects seem to have performed only a limited
number of iterative reasoning steps. This explains significantly higher price of-
fers than predicted by rational choice theory. It is possible that these results are
due to the fact that only one round per market design was played. The subjects
may learn to perform more iterative steps when playing several repetitions of
the game. Therefore, we let subjects who did not take part in treatments A or B
play 20 rounds of either the (comp) design – subsequently denoted as treatment
C – or the (part) design – treatment D. We explore the following questions:
1. In Section 3.3.1: Do prices and traded qualities decline to the level pre-
dicted by rational choice theory?
2. In Section 3.3.2: Are the subjects’ types−i stable, or do they change over
time?
3. In Section 3.3.3: Does a negative relation exist between types-i and ob-
served prices over 20 rounds?
3.3.1 Data Description
In the repeated (comp) market, 31% of price offers during all 20 rounds are
accepted, while the acceptance rate in treatment D is 53%. As in the one-shot
play, we observe higher acceptance rates in the (part) than the (comp) market,
and sellers behaved very rationally.36
35The similar analysis for treatments C and D does not yield additional insight.
36As to the sellers’ behavior, in treatment C, we observed only 4 unprofitably accepted
offers, and 17 disadvantageously rejected offers in 20 rounds of play. In treatment D, they
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Table 5: Basic Data per Round (in ECU, endowments excluded)
p Q traded Q Πb Πs
min 0.00 0.00 0.00 -3.00 -0.56
20 times (comp) average 0.93 0.49 0.23 -0.19 0.57
max 3.30 1.00 0.95 1.33 3.00
min 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.68 -1.94
20 times (part) average 1.58 0.50 0.29 0.09 0.44
max 3.00 1.00 0.98 2.94 2.68
Table 5 displays the prices and qualities, as well as the gains and losses from
trade to the buyers and the sellers. The data aggregate 20 rounds with 31
observations per round under (comp) and 20 rounds with 32 observations per
round under (part). Prices and payoffs show a tendency to be higher in the
repeated (part) than in the repeated (comp) market. As in treatments A and
B, some buyers face severe losses, especially in the (comp) design.
Figure 7 displays the development of average prices over 20 rounds. Even
in round 20, both in the (comp) and the (part) design, the markets did not
collapse to the extent predicted by rational choice theory. In the repeated
(comp) market, the average price oscillates around 0.60 during the last seven
rounds, which is far more than the theoretically predicted price of zero. The
overall average traded quality is 0.23 (see Table 5), which also substantially
deviates from the prediction of zero. Under the (part) design, the average price
ranges from 1.6 to 1.4 during the second half of the experiment. Even after many
repetitions, the offered prices exceed the perfectly rational prediction of p = 1.
In each round, the observed prices differ significantly from the theoretically
predicted price.37 The overall average traded quality of 0.29 (see Table 5) is
almost twice the 0.17 which was predicted by rational choice theory. Moreover,
prices decline both more rapidly and to a larger extent under the (comp) than
under the (part) design. This implies our next result.
Result 4: Even after 20 rounds of repeated play, prices and traded qualities
amounted to 5, and 8, respectively.
37We exemplarily give the two-sided one-sample t-test results for the last two rounds, testing
for a mean of 1. Round 19: mean = 1.380; t = 4.836; p = 0.000; round 20: mean = 1.401; t
= 5.132; p = 0.000.
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do not decline to the level predicted by rational choice theory.
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Figure 7: Price Offers in repeated (comp) and (part)
3.3.2 The Development of the Types
The average prices show a tendency to decrease over time under both treat-
ments. In light of our theory of bounded rationality, this should coincide with
an increase in the level of reasoning, the more rounds are played. Figures 8 and
9 reveal the percentage of types-0 to 2+ in the two markets.38
During the whole 20 rounds of (comp) (see Figure 8), a stable percentage
of about 60% to 70% of participants are type-0. Types-1 very quickly almost
vanish from the market and, after round 11, constitute only a small share of 3%.
The percentage of types-2+ varies between 3% and 30%. Figure 9 shows that
only one half of the subjects are of type-0 in the repeated (part) market. The
share of types-2+ is almost of the same size as in the repeated (comp) market.
From round 5 on, the percentage of types-1 amounts to about 25%, which is
much higher than under the (comp) design. Overall, the data allow us to draw
the conclusion:
Result 5: In both market designs, the percentage of type-2+ grows over
38Note that types are not necessary stable over time. A certain subject’s type-i may be ad-
justed upwards or downwards if the participant describes his reasoning accordingly. Moreover,
an individual’s development is not necessarily monotonic.
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Figure 8: Percentage of Types in 20 rounds (comp)
time. Type-1 subjects almost vanish during the 20 rounds of (comp). In (part),
the percentage of type-1 is almost stable. The number of types-0 slightly in-
creases in the repeated (comp) market, and slightly decreases in the repeated
(part) market.
Table 6: Overview of Self-descriptions through 20 periods
Subjects’ Self-descriptions 20(comp) 20(part)
20 rounds type-0 11 8
20 rounds type-1 1 5
20 rounds type-2+ 1 –
From type-0 to 1 – 2
From type-0 to 2+ 3 3
From type-1 to 2+ 1 3
From type-0 to 1 to 2+ – 1
From type-1 to 0 6 3
Forth and back 6 7
Missing 2 –
Sum 31 32
Table 6 provides an overview of the subjects’ development. We track each
buyer individually with regard to his self-described type-i through the 20 rounds.
The first column indicates the observed developments. “Forth and back” at the
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Figure 9: Percentage of Types in 20 rounds (part)
bottom of Table 6 labels subjects who – according to their self-description –
changed from low to high type, and back.39 The label “Missing” indicates
subjects who did not (completely) fill out their questionnaires. The remain-
ing nominations are self-explanatory. The entries display numbers of subjects,
which add up to 32 in 20 rounds of (part), and to 31 in (comp), respectively.
About one third of subjects remain the same type throughout the 20 rounds.
Another third shows a development from type-1 to type-0, or forth and back.
The last third of the subjects moves from lower to higher types. Pure types-1
can be observed in the (part) market, but are almost nonexistent in the repeated
(comp) market.
3.3.3 Correspondence of Types-i and Price Offers
The percentage of type-2+ grows from a very small percentage in the beginning
to about 30% during the last third in both treatments. This would explain
the observation that average prices decrease (see Figure 7). In this section, we
investigate whether all types-i choose their price offers from the type-consistent
39A development forth and back may happen if a subject starts with “trying”, then calcu-
lates E(Q) and, in the following, explains in detail that high qualities vanish from the market,
and finally turns to “gambling”. Such behavior would have been coded as a sequence “type-0,
1, 2, and back to 0”.
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intervals throughout the 20 rounds.40
We test our conjecture that price offers are type-consistent and, therefore,
types-2+ should bid lower prices than types-1. If this were true also in the
repeated game, the observed growing number of low types can be made respon-
sible for the decreasing price. Analogously to the examinations of treatments
A and B, Tables 7 and 8 display the frequencies of price offers in treatments C
and D (type-consistent choices are printed bold). The bottom two rows depict
the types’ average and median price offers.
Table 7: (comp) by Type-i: 620 possible observations, 29 descriptions missing
type-
price offer interval 0 1 2+ Sum
p > 2 57 1 0 58
1.5 ≤ p ≤ 2 103 39 18 160
1.33 < p < 1.5 6 5 9 20
p ≤ 1.33 218 27 108 353
Sum 384 72 135 591
Average price by type 1.09 1.14 0.50 –
Median price by type 1.03 1.50 0.04 –
Table 8: (part) by Type-i: 640 observations
type-
price offer interval 0 1 2+ Sum
p > 2.5 17 6 0 23
2.25 < p ≤ 2.5 17 14 0 31
1.5 ≤ p ≤ 2.25 223 122 12 357
p < 1.5 65 28 136 229
Sum 322 170 148 640
Average price by type 1.75 1.73 1.04 –
Median price by type 1.75 1.60 1.00 –
Similar to the one-shot treatments A and B, the highly significant rank order
40Because buyers and sellers were newly matched after each round, each of the 31 ·20 = 620
price offers under 20(comp), and of the 32·20 = 640 under 20(part) are treated as independent
observations. In 20(comp), however, 2 subjects filled in the questionnaire only until round
five, and round seven, respectively, hence 29 self-descriptions are missing.
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correlations that relate types-1 and 2+ to their price offers reveal that, the higher
the type, the lower the price. Spearman’s rho amounts to -0.82 in treatment C,
and to -0.4 in treatment D.41 Tables 7, and 8 show that these relations of types
and prices are based on a large number of type-consistent price choices. We,
therefore, conclude:
Result 6: During 20 rounds of repeated play, the types-i contribute to
explaining the observed prices, and the self-described iteration types 1 and 2+
are negatively correlated with the observed price offers.
Finally, though the theory predicts restricted price intervals only for type-
1 and type-2+, we explore differences in median price offers among all three
types in treatments C and D (see Tables 7, and 8 for the median prices).42
The Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA on ranks in the repeated markets reveals that the
differences in median prices among all three types are significant, H = 64.688,
df = 2, p < 0.001 in 20(comp), and H = 266.941, df = 2, p < 0.001 in 20(part).
Pairwise comparisons (Dunn’s method)43 show that, in both market settings,
types-2+ offer significantly lower prices than types-1 or types-0, which confirms
our Result 6.
4 Conclusion
We have run experiments to examine two different lemons market designs: Un-
der one design, labeled (comp), perfectly rational players are predicted to con-
clude no transaction at all. Thus, the market is expected to collapse completely.
Under the other market design, called (part), perfectly rational players are ex-
pected to trade only some units of low quality. In both market designs it would
be efficient that all units be traded. According to the empirical results for both
market designs, the average prices offered by the uninformed buyers and the
average traded qualities are higher than the predictions for perfectly rational
players.
41The tests each reveal a (one-sided) p-level of 0.000. We used the prices and self-descriptions
generated by types-1 and 2+ in each market to conduct the tests.
42As the data did neither pass the normality tests nor the equal variance tests, we use the
non-parametric alternative, i.e., the Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA on ranks. We used the prices and
self-descriptions generated by types-0, 1 and 2+ in each market to conduct the tests.
43Dunn’s method is used as a post hoc test and is conducted to a 5%-level of significance.
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A possible explanation of this behavior draws on the theory of iterative rea-
soning. Players who perform only a limited number of iteration steps to elimi-
nate dominated strategies are boundedly rational. This theory includes perfectly
rational behavior as a limit case: Such a decision-maker carries out an infinite
number of iteration steps. For all iteration types, this theory allows us to derive
a type-consistent price interval, from which an uninformed buyer of a certain
type is predicted to choose his price offer.
During the experiments, we have determined each individual buyers’ iteration
type from written self-descriptions, independently of the observed price offers.
Three types could be identified: The type-0 did not start an iteration, but picked
his price offer randomly. Type-1 was able to carry out just one iteration step.
Type-2+ decided rather elaborately, i.e., undertook at least two iteration steps.
For these types, we have compared the corresponding type-consistent price
interval with the prices which were actually offered. The vast majority of prices
were chosen from the type consistent price-interval. Moreover, for type-1 and
type-2+, we observed a significant negative correlation between types and of-
fered prices. This correlation did not vanish in the repeated play experiment.
What is more, the data indicates that type-0 subjects have chosen significantly
higher prices than type-2+ subjects. This empirical result supports the hy-
pothesis that the theory of limited iterative reasoning contributes to explaining
the behavior of buyers in lemons markets. The behavior of type-0, however, is
not captured by this theory, just as the theory of perfect rationality does not
say anything about such actors. However, using this method, we were able to
identify each player’s iteration type in each round without referring to their
price offers. Furthermore, we could determine how many subjects actually have
performed iterative reasoning at all.
The difference between the two market settings, (comp) and (part), can be
interpreted as the existence of quality insurance (e.g., by a contractual or a
mandatory warranty). With a full insurance, the valuation function of the
buyers would be horizontal. Hence, the (part) market reflects partial insurance,
while buyers in the (comp) market bear the full quality risk. The results of our
experiments show that a partial warranty may induce the buyers to offer higher
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prices and to conclude a higher number of transactions. Note that this effect of
warranty is not caused by signaling, nor does it depend on risk-aversion on the
part of buyers.
The collapse of markets that suffer from asymmetric information is an in-
spiring theoretical phenomenon. If, however, bounded rationality (in the form
of limited iterative reasoning) of the uninformed market participants is taken
into account, the inefficiency derived under the assumption of perfect rational-
ity might be greatly exaggerated. Institutional means to prevent market failure,
such as mandatory insurance, warranties, building of reputation, may therefore
go too far and be too costly. They may perhaps do even more harm than good.
This policy implication of our experiment, however, suffers from a serious
drawback: Successfully completed transactions may inflict losses upon the buy-
ers. They may have submitted their offer based on overly optimistic expecta-
tions. In such a case, having concluded a transaction may not be a Pareto-
improvement. In our (comp) market, boundedly rational buyers are even worse
off than without trade. These consumers would be interested in regulation that
protects them from participation in free trade. With regard to (comp) markets,
such a regulation would not harm the perfectly rational buyers. Hence, it is an
example of “asymmetric paternalism,” following Camerer et al. (2003).
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Appendix A
Proof of the Proposition
Let us first derive the condition for an optimal price in a general framework.
Recall that sellers value quality Q with a(Q) = βQ, while the buyers value
quality with n(Q) = γ + δQ. We assume γ ≥ 0 and δ ≥ β > 0. We can
disregard price offers p > β since they are strictly dominated by p = β. For any
price offer p ∈ [0, β], the respective buyer’s expected payoff is
Vb + Eπb(p) = Vb +
∫ a−1(p)
0
[n(Q)− p]dQ
= Vb +
∫ p/β
0
n(Q)dQ− p
2
β
= Vb +
γ
β
p +
δ
2β2
p2 − p
2
β
= Vb +
γ
β
p +
[
δ − 2β
2β2
]
p2
The first derivative with respect to p is
∂Eπb(p)
∂p
=
γ
β
+
[
δ − 2β
β2
]
p
and the second derivative is
∂2
∂p2
=
[
δ − 2β
β2
]
.
If δ ≥ 2β, then the corner solution p = β maximizes the buyer’s payoff, which
proves our third result.
If, on the other hand, δ < 2β, then an internal maximum exist, as the second-
order condition demonstrates. The first derivative equals zero if
p =
βγ
2β − δ .
Thus, in our parameter setting 1 (γ = 0 and β < δ < 2β) the maximum payoff
is obtained with p = 0. This result establishes our prediction according to which
the market collapses completely under this parameter setting.
In our second parameter setting (γ > 0 and β = δ), the second-order condition
for a maximum is satisfied, and the first-order condition can be simplified to
p =
βγ
2β − β =
βγ
β
= γ.
This establishes our second result, according to which the market collapses only
partially.
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Appendix B
The Basic Instructions (Treatment A)
You are taking part in an economic experiment. Each participant makes his
decisions in isolation from the others and enters them into an answer sheet.
Communication between participants is not allowed. Male forms like ”he” will
be used to refer to anyone.
In the experiment, there are two types of players, “buyers” and “sellers,” in the
market for good X. You take both the role of a “buyer” and the role of a
“seller.” The subjects you interact with are not located in your room but in
the room opposite to yours. There are as many subjects in your room as in the
opposite one.
The experiment consists of 2 rounds. In each of the two rounds, one seller
interacts with one buyer. In both rounds, buyers and sellers will be matched
randomly anew. Thereby, a subject from this room in the role of a seller ran-
domly interacts with a buyer from the opposite room. Likewise, a subject from
the opposite room randomly interacts as seller with a buyer from this room.
Therefore, in the role of a seller, you always sell your X to the other room.
There is only a small chance that you as a buyer interact with a seller from the
other room who simultaneously acts as buyer of your X. In each of the two
rounds, it will be randomly allotted which buyer and seller interact. Even after
the experiment, you will not be informed about who you traded with.
In each round, each seller is endowed with one unit of good X, and each buyer
has 4 Euros at his disposal.
In each of the two rounds, the situation is as follows: The sellers offer their X.
Each unit of good X has a certain quality that is only known to its seller. The
qualities of X are uniformly distributed on the interval [0,1], that is each quality
between 0 and 1 is equally probable. Thus, 0 indicates the worst and 1 the best
quality. This probability distribution is known to both buyers and sellers. The
actual quality of a unit of good X is labeled Q.
The buyers value good quality more highly than bad quality. The valuation of
a certain quality in Euros is described by a function n(Q). The exact shape of
the function n(Q) will be explained later in the instructions. No buyer
can discover the real quality prior to his decision to buy; he only knows the
probability distribution of quality. Not until after a purchase does each
buyer learn about the real Q of his unit of X.
After each round, the buyers are credited a payoff following this rule:
• If trade has taken place at price p, the buyer gets 4− p + n(Q) Euros,
• If no trade has taken place, the buyer gets 4 Euros.
As for the sellers, the function a(Q) = 3Q denotes their value of good X in
Euros: If X is not sold in one round, the seller receives a(Q) Euros in that
round. If, in contrast, a seller sells his X, he obtains the respective sales price.
The totalled payoffs of the two rounds are the earnings of buyers and sellers.
Each round passes as follows:
1. First, the buyer makes his decision and enters his proposal for a sales price
on his form (there are separate forms for each of the two rounds). All
forms will then be collected by the experiment supervisor and randomly
distributed to the sellers in the other room. Each seller gets exactly one
form.
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2. Each seller gets assigned a certain quality. Then he decides whether or
not he wants to sell his unit X at the price proposed by the buyer. He
enters this decision in the form. If a sale is made, he also enters the actual
quality of the unit sold.
3. Again, the forms will be collected by the experiment supervisor and given
back to the respective buyers. If a purchase has taken place, the buyer is
informed about the real quality of the good X that he bought.
4. This completes one round.
5. After the two rounds, each player gets paid his total payoffs in cash.
Instructions Buyers, 1. round44
Your subject number is:
During this round, the situation on the X-market is as follows (also see Figure
10):
• Each buyer owns exactly 4 Euros, and each seller owns exactly one unit
of X.
• The buyer’s valuation of the quality of good X in the first round is n(Q) =
1 + 3Q. Thus, for example, one unit of good X with quality Q = 0.7 is
worth n(0.7) = 3.1 Euros to each buyer.
• The sellers value X by a(Q) = 3Q. Therefore, the same unit is worth
a(0.7) = 2.1 Euros to the seller.
10.5
a(Q) = 3Q
Q
Euros
1
3
n(Q) = 1+3Q
Figure 10:
Example:
44The instructions for the second round are the same, except for the altered n(Q) which
then is n(Q) = 4Q.
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We assume a buyer to purchase an X at price p = 2.4 Euros, and the real quality
of that X to be Q = 0.3. Thus, p > n(Q). Then, the buyer receives an amount
of (4 − 2.4 + 1.9) = 3.5 Euros out of this round. If, in contrast, he buys this
unit (with Q = 0.3) at price p = 1.1 Euros, then p < n(Q). His earnings will
then be (4 - 1.1 + 1.9) Euros = 4.8 Euros.
Offer Form (Round 1)45
The decision of a buyer
Your subject number is:
My price offer:
I want to buy one unit of X at price p = . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The decision of a seller
Your subject number is (please fill in!): . . .
My decision :
( ) I decline the offer.
( ) I accept. My unit of X is of quality Q = . . . .
The Questionnaire
Description of sellers’ reasoning:
Your subject number is:
Please briefly describe - in each round - the reasoning that led to your particular
sales price proposal in that round:
Round 1:
Round 2:
Appendix C
Here, we present some typical verbal statements of our participants.
Type-0 is supposed to not even calculate an expected quality. Some of the
written statements that we coded as types-0 are, for example:
• “I chose p such that quality gets better,”
• “I had no idea, I just gambled,”
45The form for Round 2 is similar.
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• “Seller only sells if p > 3Q; my choice was arbitrary – best choice would
have been 1 Cent above 3Q,”
• “Defensive behavior - better to be left with the good on my hands,”
• “I analyzed what the seller’s quality must be, compared to my price offer,”
• “Profits rise with higher risk – no alternative seems to have decisive ad-
vantages, so I chose the middle course.”
Type-1 is expected to explicitly use an expected quality of 1/2 in their calcula-
tions. Some examples are:
• “E(Q) = 1/2 and a(Q) = 1.5; thus, my offer is 1.51,”
• “Since Q is uniformly distributed, I used Q < 1/2 (risk-averse). Because
a(Q) = 3Q, I chose p = 1.5,”
• “With E(Q) = 0.5 a price p = 1.5 is accepted with probability 1/2,”
• “I calculated E(Q) = 0.5 and wanted to make some profits.”
Finally, type-2+ performs at least one more step of iterative reasoning than
type-1. Therefore, type-2+ knows that the conditional expected quality clearly
is smaller than 1/2 and a loss is to be expected with too high a price. Some
examples (from the (part) market) are:
• “I compared possible gains and losses in a table; the chance to gain is 1:3
compared to the chance to lose; this is too risky,”
• “The possible loss is always higher than the possible gain; thus, on average
there is always a loss,”
• “The expected gains are always smaller than 0; an offer is advantageous
only if the slope of n(Q) is at least twice as much as the slope of a(Q),”
• “E.g., at p = 1.6 the seller sells if Q < 0.5: with Q = 0.5 profits are 40
cents, with Q = 0.4 profits are zero, with Q = 0.3 losses are 40 cents, and
so on; thus, there is a negative expected profit.”
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